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Counter-terrorist seCurity: the example 
of the speCial powers of the polish  
speCial serviCes in the field  
of surveillanCe of foreign nationals
The research question presented in this paper concerns selected anti-terrorist security 
issues, in the context of the special powers of the Polish special services in the field 
of surveillance of foreign nationals. The issue of anti-terrorist security was reduced to 
the issues connected with the assessment of the effectiveness of combating terrorism 
by the Polish special services, and to the assessment of potential costs related to the 
possibility of violating the privacy of Polish citizens and foreign nationals when cer-
tain types of surveillance activities are used. Therefore, it should be recognized that an 
important problem taken up in this analysis is the relationship between the sphere of 
security and the private sphere, which is connected with the rights and freedoms of an 
individual in a democratic state governed by the rule of law.
In criminal policy related to the combating of certain types of crime, it is important 
to indicate: (1) the legal interest to be protected, (2) the degree of protection of such 
interest, and (3) the means to be used to protect the interest. In a democratic state gov-
erned by the rule of law, criminal policy must not only be an instrument to exercise 
power but should also be a means of protecting interests that are valuable to society. 
This general assumption inevitably leads to a conflict between different types of inter-
ests – between security and the rights and freedoms of individuals. This, however, does 
not change the fact that, in a democratic state governed by the rule of law, emphasis is 
placed on the protection of rights related to individual freedoms (cf. Gruszecka, 2012; 
Kulesza, 2014: 87–110; Tarapata, 2016; Kulesza, 2017: 95–112).
When terrorist threats are invoked in today’s democratic states governed by the rule 
of law, there is a visible tendency to abuse the interest of security to justify legisla-
tion. There is dangerous tendency to overuse the penalization of certain actions and 
the creation of oversight mechanisms, even when there is only a potential threat that 
these actions might infringe any interests. In a democracy, penalization and oversight 
mechanisms should be applied only when the threat is real and imminent, rather than 
only potential and abstract. Therefore, any solutions which encroach on the freedom 
and rights of an individual should be considered in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality (cf. the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of April 26, 1995, file 
ref. K 11/94, 1995; Dukiet-Nagórska, 2010; Hryniewicz, 2012; Brodzisz, 2013: 17–41; 
Hryniewicz-Lach, 2015; Rychlewska, 2016: 131–149; Kulesza, 2017).
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The main objective of the analysis contained in this paper is to present the con-
sequences of introducing legal changes to give the special services the power to use 
special types of surveillance on foreign nationals. In the analysis, particular attention 
was paid to the remit and powers of one of the special services, namely the Internal Se-
curity Agency (Polish: Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, the ABW). Due to the 
need to narrow down the scope of the identified research issue, the following research 
questions are presented in the paper: (1) To what extent can mechanisms in Polish 
law influence the effectiveness of combating terrorism by the Polish special services? 
(2) To what extent can mechanisms in Polish law in the field of combating terrorism 
violate the rights and freedoms of Polish citizens and foreign nationals?
The analysis presented in this paper is mainly of an indicative nature. The legal 
and institutional approach was used to analyze the endeavors and powers of the Polish 
special services in the context of the surveillance activities they perform on both Polish 
and foreign nationals. On the other hand, the analysis of individual legal solutions was 
based on a dogmatic and doctrinal interpretation, and a pro-constitutional interpreta-
tion of the provisions of substantive and procedural criminal law (cf. Wronkowska, 
Ziembiński, 1997: 147–179; Wronkowska, 2005: 76–91; Korybski, Leszczyński, 
2015: 150–165; Nowacki, Tabor, 2016: 293–312; Rychlewska, 2016: 131–149).
i. CharaCteristiCs of statutory Changes related  
to the speCial serviCes in 2015-2018
After the change of government in 2015, rapid changes took place in the field of sub-
stantive criminal law, procedural criminal law and acts governing the activities of the 
special services in Poland. In the period 2015–2018, changes were made to existing 
laws or new ones were introduced regarding: (1) tapping and recording conversations 
(under criminal procedural law), (2) the subject of operational oversight (under indi-
vidual laws governing the operation of the special services and the police), (3) new acts 
classified as “terrorist offenses” (under substantive criminal law), (4) special powers 
given to Polish counterintelligence in connection with combating and counteracting 
terrorist activity (under the new Act on Anti-Terrorist Activities (hereafter the Anti-
Terrorism Act or ATA), and (5) extension of the remit of Polish civilian counterintel-
ligence to include combating crimes against the Judiciary (e.g. false testimony and 
false accusations).
During this period, the Polish government also worked on changes concerning the 
activities of Polish civil intelligence and counterintelligence. Analysts indicated that 
a consolidation of these two types of special services into a single National Security 
Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego) was very likely. Analysts also indi-
cated that the new service would be given new powers regarding operational over-
sight, while at the same time real judicial oversight over them would be minimized. 
In connection with the projected direction of changes in the special services, it was 
assumed that the ministries would also be reorganized in such a way that a new minis-
try would be established (the Ministry of Security) which would become a center for 
governing all the special services, even the military ones (cf. Miłosz, 2017; Rosicki, 
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2017; Stankiewicz, 2017b). The fact that this did not occur is due to several factors, 
including: (1) the focus of the ruling coalition on extensive changes to the judiciary 
at various levels (Constitutional Tribunal, Supreme Court, common courts of all in-
stances), (2) rivalry, mainly within the party and between individual members of the 
government, and (3) changes in the management positions of the special services (cf. 
Czuchnowski, 2017a; Czuchnowski, 2017b; Kacprzak, Zawadka, 2017).
In the period 2015–2018, no organizational irregularities or dysfunctions within Polish 
counterintelligence and civil intelligence were eliminated, despite them being discussed 
earlier in the press and academic literature. Therefore, there were no positive changes to 
solve the problems in Polish counterintelligence and intelligence activity. In particular, 
attention should be paid to the Internal Security Agency (the ABW), as it is currently 
responsible for coordinating all activities in the field of combating terrorist threats (cf. 
Articles 5, 7, 8 and 17 of the ATA). When analyzing the performance of the ABW in 
the period 2015–2018, the problems from which it had suffered in the past continued: 
(1) ‘politicization’ and ‘political partisanship,’ (2) the instrumental treatment of the ABW 
as a part of the patronage system, (3) inappropriate selection of staff, which led to the 
employment of personnel who did not meet the requirements related to competence and 
the appropriate attitude towards serving the state, (4) lack of reliable and transparent 
advancement mechanisms, (5) lack of an appropriate system of training and courses 
within the service, and (6) excessively broad remit, while simultaneously duplicating 
responsibilities held by other Polish special services (cf. Czuchnowski 2016; Rosicki, 
2016: 165–176; Czuchnowski, 2017c; Kacprzak, 2017; Sąd zawiadomił prokuraturę..., 
2017; Stankiewicz, 2017a; Pietrzak, 2018).
ii. CharaCteristiCs of statutory Changes to the powers 
of the speCial serviCes in ComBating terrorism
1. gathering information on terrorism
Interestingly, even before the legislative changes of 2016, the Internal Security Agency 
was the main entity dealing with combating terrorist threats (cf. AoISA&FIA; Makar-
ski, 2010: 101–112; Obuchowicz, 2014: 275–280). The Anti-Terrorism Act, on the 
other hand, designated the ABW as the main coordinator of anti-terrorist policy and 
gave it many powers to use various measures on Polish citizens and foreign nationals 
(cf. Jałoszewski, Kondzińska, 2016). In connection with the prevention of terrorist 
incidents, the Head of the ABW was granted the power to maintain an inventory (da-
tabase) of information on both Polish and foreign nationals. The inventory includes, 
in particular, the following categories of individuals: (1) persons engaging in activities 
on behalf of terrorist organizations or organizations associated with terrorist activities, 
(2) persons who are members of terrorist organizations or organizations associated 
with terrorist activities, (3) wanted persons engaging in terrorist activities or suspected 
of committing terrorist offenses, (4) persons reasonably suspected of engaging in ac-
tivities leading to terrorist offenses, (5) persons constituting a threat to the security of 
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civil aviation, (6) persons participating in terrorist training, and (7) persons undertak-
ing travel for the purpose of committing terrorist offenses (Article 6.1.1–4 of the ATA). 
The Anti-Terrorism Act indicates that there must be four different sets of data that can 
be collected in a single register, the database. Moreover, there is no indication that all 
data must be covert, so, at least in theory, this information does not have to be kept 
fully confidential, for example information on persons wanted under the European Ar-
rest Warrant (cf. Gabriel-Węglowski, 2018: 70–72).
A separate category of data is collected to identify citizens of other countries by 
individual services, including the special services. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, of-
ficers of the Internal Security Agency, the Police and the Border Guard, with respect to 
persons who are not Polish citizens, have been granted the following powers: (1) fin-
gerprinting, (2) facial image preservation, and (3) non-invasive collection of biologi-
cal material (for DNA profiling purposes). This data may be obtained by individual 
services when: (1) there is doubt as to the identity of the person, (2) the person is 
suspected of illegally crossing the Polish border, (3) there is doubt as to the declared 
purpose of stay in Poland, (4) there is a suspicion of intent to illegally stay on Polish 
territory, (5) there is a suspected connection between the person and a terrorist event, 
or (6) there is a suspicion that the person could have participated in terrorist training 
(Article 10.1.1–5 of the ATA). According to the ATA, the entity which has at its dis-
posal the collected information is the Commander in Chief of the Police, within the 
framework of the existing system of police databases (Article 10.2–5 of the ATA). 
It seems that these regulations significantly interfere with the procedural position of 
foreign nationals, depriving them of equal treatment under substantive and procedural 
criminal law. For example, it should be pointed out that the premise of a suspected con-
nection between a person and a terrorist event is sufficient for the Polish legislator to 
treat a foreigner as a suspect under procedural criminal law, which results in the obli-
gation to undergo, for example, external and other examinations (Article 74.3 Code of 
Criminal Procedure (CCP)). However, under the ATA, if there is a suspicion that a ter-
rorist offense has been committed, if it is required by the (preparatory) proceedings, 
the decision to press charges may be drawn up on the basis of information obtained 
by operational-and-intelligence activities, including surveillance activities specified 
in the ATA (Article 26.1 of the ATA). The latter solution is somewhat dubious due to 
the infringement of the rights and freedoms of an individual inherent in a democratic 
state governed by the rule of law, as the legislator has also included the possibility of 
depriving both Polish citizens and foreign nationals of liberty for a period of more than 
forty-eight hours. Moreover, information from operational-and-intelligence activities, 
including from surveillance activities specified in the Anti-Terrorism Act, is a suffi-
cient premise for this type of deprivation of liberty.
2. A terrorist offense
The term terrorist offense was introduced into the Criminal Law Act in 2004. The 
introduction of a legal definition of a terrorist offense resulted from the adaptation of 
Polish legislation to the content and requirements of the framework decision of the 
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Council of the European Union on combating terrorism (Council Framework Deci-
sion, 2002/475/JHA; Report from the Commission, 2007). According to the solutions 
included in Article 115.20 of the Criminal Law Act, a terrorist offense is a prohibited 
act committed in order to: (1) seriously intimidate many persons, (2) coerce a public 
authority of Poland or another state, or an authority of an international organization, 
to undertake or refrain from certain activities, or (3) cause serious disturbances in the 
political system or economy of Poland, another state or an international organization. 
Even the threat of committing a terrorist offense will also constitute such an act. How-
ever, an important formal premise is the reservation that the prohibited act should be 
subject to a maximum of 5 years’ imprisonment by way of punishment (Article 115.20 
of the Criminal Code (CC); Rosicki, 2015: 93–96).
It should be noted that the construction of the aforementioned provision means that 
even if at least one motivational premise and a general formal premise exist, any pro-
hibited act indicated in criminal law will be terrorist offense. It seems that this provi-
sion does not meet the basic principles of legislation in a democratic state governed by 
the rule of law because of: (1) difficulty in unambiguously identifying a legal interest 
whose protection would be valuable for society (the provision uses an unspecified ob-
ject of the offense), (2) identification of the types of acts which are prohibited mainly 
due to the abstract exposure of the legal interest to danger, and (3) the inclusion by the 
legislator of a large number of vague and ambiguous constituent features of an offense. 
The group of vague features includes, among others, the following: (1) serious intimi-
dation, (2) many people (the legal doctrine is not clear and at least three interpretative 
positions can be given), (3) serious disturbances of the political system, and (4) serious 
disturbance of the economy of an international organization (cf. Rosicki, 2015: 93–96; 
Kozłowska-Kalisz, 2018: 388–389; Gabriel-Węglowski, 2018: 53–58).
3. anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist activities
The concepts of anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist activities have been introduced by 
the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act (Article 2.1 and 2 of the ATA). By anti-terror-
ist activities, the legislator understands a specific type of event that should be prevent-
ed by public administrative authorities. The designated events are events of a terrorist 
nature. At this point one should note that the legislator has introduced the term terrorist 
event in addition to the previously accepted term terrorist offense. A terrorist event is 
one in which there is a suspicion that it occurred as a result of a terrorist offense, or in 
which there is the threat of a terrorist offense (Article 2.7 of the ATA). It can therefore 
be said that an event of a terrorist nature is determined by the presumption of an effect 
and by the presumption of a threat.
In the case of counter-terrorist activities, the legislator wanted to point to a spe-
cific type of activity directed against perpetrators, as well as individuals preparing or 
assisting in committing a terrorist offense. These activities should be carried out to 
eliminate the immediate danger to the life, health or liberty of people or property by 
using specialized forces and methods and by applying specialized tactics (Article 2.2. 
of the ATA).
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The problems of interpretation affect the issues related to the application of special 
types of measures towards Polish and foreign nationals. For example, the mere fact 
that an event is defined as a terrorist event is the basis for the Head of the ABW to 
maintain a list of persons related to terrorism and to collect data on them (Article 6 of 
the ATA). On the other hand, the Head of the ABW can use special surveillance meas-
ures with regard to foreign nationals in order to collect intelligence about, prevent or 
combat terrorist offenses, if there is merely a concern as to the possibility of these peo-
ple conducting terrorist activities (Article 9 of the ATA). Meanwhile, the application 
of a special procedure for pressing charges and pre-trial detention of Polish citizens 
and foreigners is based on the suspicion of having committed a terrorist offense, the 
justification for which may be information obtained only by means of operational-and-
intelligence activities, including surveillance activities specified in the Anti-Terrorism 
Act (Article 26 of the ATA).
iii. CharaCteristiCs of the powers of the speCial serviCes 
 in the field of surveillanCe of foreign nationals 
 in ConneCtion with a terrorist threat
1. general characteristics of surveillance by the special services
On the basis of the information submitted by the Public Prosecutor General to the leg-
islative authority, it should be pointed out that all authorized services submitted a total 
of 6,035 requests to order the tapping and recording of conversations, or requests to 
administer operational oversight in 2016. Out of a total of 6,035 requests, the court 
granted permission to 97.5%, which means that only a small number of cases were 
considered unfounded. It should be noted that, as a general rule, oversight in Poland 
is administered in two stages, i.e. first at the level of the prosecutor’s office, and then 
at the level of the court. Consequently, we are dealing with both prosecutor and court 
oversight of requests for the surveillance of individuals (Attorney General’s informa-
tion, 2017).
The service responsible for the largest number of requests is the Police (almost 
80%), followed by the Border Guard (6.8%), Internal Security Agency (4.3%), Cen-
tral Anti-Corruption Bureau (almost 3.6%), Military Police (2.7%), and other services 
(less than 1%). The Police is the largest service, within the framework of which there is 
also a special uniformed formation, the Police Central Bureau of Investigation, which 
deals with the most dangerous crimes, hence the highest number of requests related to 
tapping and recording conversations, and to operational oversight. It is worth noting 
that there is a significant number of these requests submitted by the Military Police, 
which, apart from the Police, ranks third in terms of the number of requests (following 
the Polish civilian counterintelligence service and the service combating corruption). 
Moreover, it should be noted that the Police submitted the highest number of requests 
rejected by the prosecutor’s office and the court in 2016 (125 cases), which may be due 
to the very large number of requests they submitted. If the ratio of rejected requests to 
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the number of requests submitted by a particular organization is assessed, first place 
is taken by the Military Police (5.9%), followed by the Military Counterintelligence 
Service (2.9%), the Police (almost 2.6%), the Border Guard (2.1%), the Internal Se-
curity Agency (1.5%) and the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (1.3%) (Attorney Gen-
eral’s information, 2017; Rosicki, 2017).
It is worth noting that academic, popular science and journalistic analyses on the 
level of surveillance in Poland indicate a high level of involvement of the Polish spe-
cial services in this type of operational oversight. Moreover, it should be emphasized 
that statutory changes on the basis of the so-called surveillance act (full name: Act on 
the Amendment of the Act on Police and Certain Other Acts, Journal of Laws 2016, 
item 147) and the Anti-Terrorism Act violate the principles of a democratic state gov-
erned by the rule of law in the area of individual rights and freedoms (cf. Rosicki, 
2014: 63–75; Gierak-Onoszko, 2016: 10–13; Wniosek Rzecznika Praw Obywatels-
kich z dnia 18 lutego 2016 r. (sygn. akt K 9/16), 2016; Pytlakowski, 2017: 22–25; Rok 
z ustawą inwigilacyjną, 2017).
2. procedure for the surveillance of foreigners
According to the Anti-Terrorism Act, the entity responsible for initiating the procedure 
to undertake surveillance activities with regard to foreign nationals is the Head of the 
ABW (Article 9.1 of the ATA). Under specific arrangements, various surveillance ac-
tivities with regard to foreign nationals may be undertaken only in order to prevent or 
combat terrorist offenses, and when there is a fear that foreign nationals may carry out 
terrorist activities. This provision indicates that two simultaneous conditions must be 
fulfilled regarding the objective of the operation of the ABW (preventing and combat-
ing a specific type of crime), and the possibility of a given foreign national carrying out 
terrorist activities. These conditions are made up of terms specified from a legal point 
of view, as well as of subject-matter constituent features for which there is no legal ba-
sis, e.g. in the constituent features of prohibited acts or in legal definitions. An example 
of a phrasing for which there is no legal definition is terrorist activities, which consti-
tute one of the parallel conditions for the use of surveillance activities by the Head of 
the ABW. The carrying out of terrorist activities as a constituent feature did not previ-
ously feature in the provisions of criminal law, and the closest equivalent of this term 
was prohibited activities, which were constituent features of selected crimes against 
peace and humanity, and constituent features of war crimes. Other similar phrasings 
include: activities for the benefit of foreign intelligence (in the framework of selected 
offenses against the State), organizing and directing foreign intelligence activities (in 
the framework of selected offenses against the State), participating in an organized 
group or association with the purpose of committing a criminal offense, including par-
ticipating in groups whose purpose is committing a terrorist offense (in the framework 
of selected offenses against public order).
Therefore, a surveillance procedure applied to a foreign national must be initiated 
by an order from the Head of the ABW. According to the law, this order, together with 
its justification, must be immediately forwarded to the Minister Coordinator of the 
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Special Services, if a Coordinator has been appointed, and also to the Public Prosecu-
tor General, who, according to the current legal situation, is also the Minister of Justice 
(Article 9.4 of the ATA). The Public Prosecutor General may order the discontinuation 
of surveillance activities against a foreign national (Article 9.4 ATA). It is worth point-
ing out that this procedure lacks a judicial oversight mechanism, as provided for under 
the Act on the Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency itself, regard-
ing the application of operational oversight measures (cf. Rogalski, 2017: 92–120). 
According to this procedure, surveillance activities may be carried out for a maximum 
period of three months but may be extended under the conditions laid down in the Act 
on the Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency (Article 9.1 of the 
ATA; Article 27 of the AoISA&FIA). The results of the work in this period, obtained 
by means of the various types of surveillance, should be communicated as informa-
tion to the Public Prosecutor General as soon as they have been completed (Article 9.6 
ATA). It is worth noting at this point that the Polish legislator once again abandoned 
oversight mechanisms through the courts, as is the norm in democratic states governed 
by the rule of law – it is only the Public Prosecutor General, not the court, that decides 
on the scope and manner of using information gained from the surveillance of a for-
eign national (Article 9.7. of the ATA).
If the materials provided by the Head of the ABW do not contain any evidence of 
an offense or are not important for state security, the Public Prosecutor General orders 
the destruction of the materials resulting from surveillance activities (Article 9.8 of the 
ATA). Following the above, the Head of the ABW, immediately after the order from 
the Public Prosecutor General, must perform a witnessed and recorded destruction of 
the material (Article 9.9 of the ATA).
The main problems with the application of the procedure are as follows: (1) the 
wide range of activities of the ABW, including intelligence, prevention and combating 
of terrorist offenses; (2) the use of a vague term, i.e. concerns about the possibility 
of conducting terrorist activities; and (3) the lack of a statutory definition of the term 
foreign national.
What is worth noting is the fairly broad range of purposes for which surveillance 
means can be used with respect to foreign nationals. This covers the collection of intel-
ligence, prevention and combating terrorist offenses. Therefore, we are dealing with 
preventive, operational-and-intelligence, and procedural powers held by the ABW. On 
the other hand, limiting surveillance activities to one type of offense, i.e. terrorist of-
fenses, may be misleading, which results from previous remarks concerning the under-
standing of the content of the legal definition of this type of offense. It should also be 
added that the vague phrase concerns about the possibility of conducting terrorist ac-
tivities, contrary to what M. Gabriel-Węglowski claims, does not effectively limit the 
use of surveillance activities (Gabriel-Węglowski, 2018: 76–77). The term concern, 
from the point of view of the special services, rather than from the normative point 
of view, could be used liberally – all the more so as surveillance measures applied on 
the basis of the Anti-Terrorism Act, contrary to the measures within the framework of 
operational oversight specified in the Act on the Internal Security Agency and Foreign 
Intelligence Agencies, are not limited by the principle of subsidiarity. The principle 
of subsidiarity would require the verification of surveillance requests from the point 
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of view of whether other measures have proved to be ineffective or of no use to the 
special services (cf. Article 9.1 of the ATA; Article 27.1 of the AoISA&FIA). It should 
therefore be assumed that solutions concerning the surveillance of foreign nationals 
are a departure from this principle, which is also one of the elements of the protection 
of privacy in democratic states governed by the rule of law.
The Anti-Terrorism Act does not have its own definition of the term foreign na-
tional; hence, in an attempt to define the scope of persons to whom the surveillance is 
to apply, the contents of the Act on Foreign Nationals must be used. According to the 
above Act, a foreign national is any person who does not have Polish citizenship (Art. 
3.2 of the Act on Foreign Nationals). However, it should be added that “a Polish citi-
zen who simultaneously holds the citizenship of another state has the same rights and 
obligations towards the Republic of Poland as a person who holds Polish citizenship 
exclusively.” As a result, a Polish national “may not invoke before the authorities of 
the Republic of Poland, with legal effect, the citizenship of another state and the rights 
and obligations arising therefrom” (Article 3.1–2 of the Act on Polish Citizenship). 
According to this interpretation, it is impossible to apply special types of surveillance 
measures to persons holding Polish citizenship and, at the same time, citizenship of 
another state. However, in the absence of sufficient oversight of surveillance measures 
at the level of the prosecution and of the court that may be used by the special serv-
ices, including in the case of instrumental use of the law, such limitations might be not 
enforced. One may also consider the problem of differentiating people on the basis of 
their citizenship, as this cannot be used to limit the rights which are included, for exam-
ple, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) (cf. Case of Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, 2016; Bychawska-Siniarska, 2017). 
However, what is certain is that any surveillance in a democratic state governed by the 
rule of law should be overseen by a court or an authority exercising judicial power. The 
case that is described by this paper shows that this is not present (cf. Case of Malone 
v. The United Kingdom, 1984).
3. scope of surveillance activities
The types of surveillance activities which under special conditions may be applied 
to foreign nationals include: (1) obtaining and recording the content of conversations 
made using technical means, including using telecommunications networks; (2) ob-
taining and preserving images or sounds of persons from premises, means of transport 
or places other than public spaces; (3) obtaining and recording the content of corre-
spondence, including correspondence carried out by means of electronic communica-
tion; (4) obtaining and recording data contained on IT data carriers, telecommunica-
tion terminal equipment, IT and ICT systems; and (5) accessing and controlling the 
content of letters or parcels (Article 9.1.1–5 of the ATA).
The enumerated surveillance measures are the same as the operational oversight 
measures specified by the legislator in the Act on the Internal Security Agency and the 
Intelligence Agency (Article 27.6.1–5 of the AoISA&FIA; Bożek et al., 2014: 125–132; 
Rogalski, 2017: 92–120). At this point, one may ask oneself for what purpose the legis-
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lator repeated the list of types of surveillance measures which had already been defined 
in another act. The mere fact that the measures had a different personal scope does 
not seem to be sufficient to explain this. There are two reasons for this, which include 
justifications (1) of a political nature, and (2) of a functional nature. In the first case, at-
tention should be paid to the unconstitutionality of the scope and basis of applying op-
erational oversight by the special services in Poland and the possible negative effects 
of negating this scope and basis. However, the risk of negating the legal basis for the 
application of operational oversight is currently only theoretical given the changes in 
the law on the judiciary, resulting in dysfunctional constitutional control in the period 
in question. As a result of the statutory changes, there are no real mechanisms for the 
independent examination of compliance of legal acts with the Constitution in Poland. 
As a consequence, the fundamental principles of the democratic state governed by the 
rule of law are violated (cf. Opinion..., 2016; Szuleka, Wolny, Szwed, 2016; Gersdorf, 
2018a; Gersdorf, 2018b; Żaczkiewicz-Zborska, 2018). In the latter case, i.e. where 
there is a functional justification, attention should be paid to the desire to conceal sur-
veillance powers already in the hands of the special services, referred to as operational 
oversight. This takes place alongside the simultaneous liberalization of surveillance 
oversight mechanisms, and thus alongside the resulting more liberal use of them by the 
special services. The rationale for a functional approach is as follows: (1) the lack of 
judicial oversight of the initial application of surveillance measures, (2) the possibility 
of carrying out surveillance throughout the full period, even after the conditions for its 
application have ceased, and (3) strengthening the position of the Public Prosecutor 
General at the expense of judicial oversight (the Public Prosecutor General decides on 
the scope and use of surveillance material) (cf. Gabriel-Węglowski, 2018: 78–91).
* * *
The main purpose of the analysis in this paper was to indicate the consequences of 
introducing legal changes concerning the powers of the special services, with particu-
lar reference to the powers of the Internal Security Agency. The focus was the powers 
of the Internal Security Agency regarding the application of special types of surveil-
lance activities with respect to persons who do not have Polish citizenship, under the 
Anti-Terrorist Act, with the presentation of the broader legal context. In order to give 
a more in-depth analysis of the subject at hand, the paper asked the following research 
questions: (1) To what extent can mechanisms in Polish law influence the effectiveness 
of combating terrorism by the Polish special services? (2) To what extent can mecha-
nisms in Polish law in the field of combating terrorism violate the rights and freedoms 
of Polish citizens and foreign nationals? The individual questions were linked to the 
following conclusions:
1. Conclusions related to the first question:
Legal mechanisms regarding the surveillance powers of the special services under the 
so-called Surveillance Act and the Anti-Terrorism Act should be considered helpful in 
improving the effectiveness of obtaining information on terrorist events and terrorist 
offenses. There are at least two main problems to be addressed regarding the expan-
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sion of the ABW’s remit: (1) broader powers to apply operational oversight measures 
in the absence of appropriate mechanisms to oversee their application, and (2) broader 
powers to apply operational oversight measures in the absence of gains in organiza-
tional efficiency. In the first case, an increase in the ABW’s powers is at the expense of 
rights and freedoms, thus at the expense of principles attributed to a democratic state 
governed by the rule of law, including the principle of proportionality. In the latter 
case, the range of activities and powers of the ABW is broadened on the grounds of 
new legal solutions. However, no attempt is made to increase its internal efficiency. 
This lack of efficiency is associated with the high level of ‘politicization’ and ‘political 
partisanship’ of the ABW, inappropriate selection of staff, and the lack of an appropri-
ate training system combined with a lack of adequate supervision. This, together with 
an unreasonably broad remit, leads to the inappropriate use of the powers of the ABW 
in the fight against crimes against national security and terrorism.
2. Conclusions related to the second question:
It should be noted that changes ensuing from the so-called Surveillance Act of 2016 do 
not meet the recommendations issued by the Constitutional Tribunal to the legislator 
in connection with the recognition that individual provisions in the field of operational 
oversight, applied by individual services, are unconstitutional. This means that surveil-
lance activities (activities within the scope of operational oversight) on the grounds of 
the aforementioned Act could violate the rights and freedoms of both Polish and foreign 
nationals. The ABW still enjoys significant and unjustified access to telecommunica-
tions data, the collection of which is not subject to restrictions, which are the basis for 
recording telephone conversations, for example. The oversight mechanism related to 
the procedure for obtaining consent for particular activities in the field of operational 
oversight and telecommunications data should be considered as fictitious. Thereby, the 
transparency of the ABW’s activities in this area continues to remain low.
In the case of the Anti-Terrorism Act, the additional powers in the field of surveil-
lance of foreign nationals are in principle a repetition of those contained in the Act 
on the Internal Security Agency and the Foreign Intelligence Agency with respect to 
all persons. The difference is that covert activities applied by the ABW in connec-
tion with combating terrorism are subject to even less oversight than in the case of 
the ABW’s general remit. The legislator opted not to require judicial oversight of the 
initial applications for surveillance of foreign nationals. This has to be considered as 
a violation of the fundamental principles of a democratic state governed by the rule 
of law, including the principle of proportionality. Moreover, it should be noted that 
the surveillance of foreign nationals is not limited by the principle of subsidiarity, 
which can also be considered a violation of the principles of a democratic state gov-
erned by the rule of law.
Moreover, the introduction of a special procedure for presenting charges and for 
pre-trial detention of Polish citizens and persons who do not have Polish citizenship, 
based on materials obtained on the basis of operational oversight, including surveil-
lance activities, set out in the Anti-Terrorism Act, should be considered at least consti-
tutionally dubious. This may be considered a further breach of the principles of a dem-
ocratic state governed by the rule of law, including the principle of proportionality.
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The material scope of the analysis presented in this paper refers to special powers held by the 
Polish special services with respect to the surveillance of foreign nationals in connection with 
terrorist threats and terrorist offenses. This paper connects the issue of anti-terrorist measures 
with the assessment of the effectiveness of the Polish special services and with the assessment 
of potential social costs, which are related to the increase in the powers held by these services 
in the field of surveillance of Polish citizens and foreign nationals. The analysis of the powers 
of the special services focuses on the powers of one of the counterintelligence services, i.e. the 
Internal Security Agency (Polish: ABW).
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The purpose of this paper is to indicate the consequences of the introduction of legal changes 
concerning the powers held by the special services in the scope of applying particular types of 
surveillance activities (operational-and-intelligence activities). It poses the following research 
questions: (1) To what extent can mechanisms in Polish law influence the effectiveness of com-
bating terrorism by the Polish special services? (2) To what extent can mechanisms in Polish 
law in the field of combating terrorism violate the rights and freedoms of Polish citizens and 
foreign nationals? In order to answer the research questions, the activities and powers of Polish 
special services were analyzed from a legal and institutional point of view. On the other hand, 
to analyze legal regulations related to surveillance, the author applied a dogmatic and doctrinal 
interpretation and a pro-constitutional interpretation of the provisions of criminal law.
 
Keywords: anti-terrorist safety, information security, terrorist offenses, surveillance, the special 
services
BEZPIECZEŃSTWO ANTYTERRORYSTYCZNE NA PRZYKŁADZIE  
SZCZEGÓLNYCH UPRAWNIEŃ POLSKICH SŁUŻB SPECJALNYCH  
W ZAKRESIE INWIGILACJI CUDZOZIEMCÓW 
 
stresZCZenie
Zakres przedmiotowy analizy w tekście dotyczy szczególnego rodzaju uprawnień polskich służb 
specjalnych w zakresie inwigilacji cudzoziemców w związku ze zwalczaniem zagrożeń terro-
rystycznych i przestępstw o charakterze terrorystycznym. Problematyka bezpieczeństwa anty-
terrorystycznego powiązana została w tekście z oceną efektywności działania polskich służb 
specjalnych oraz z oceną potencjalnych kosztów społecznych, które wiążą się ze zwiększeniem 
uprawnień tych służb w zakresie inwigilacji obywateli polskich i cudzoziemców. W przypadku 
analizy uprawnień służb specjalnych skupiono się na uprawnieniach jednej ze służb kontrwy-
wiadowczych, czyli Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (Pol. ABW).
Celem jest wskazanie konsekwencji, jakie wiążą się z wprowadzeniem zmian prawnych do-
tyczących uprawnień służb specjalnych w zakresie stosowania szczególnego rodzaju czynności 
inwigilacyjnych (czynności operacyjno-rozpoznawczych). W tekście zaprezentowano następu-
jące pytania badawcze: (1) W jakim stopniu rozwiązania w polskim prawie wpływać mogą 
na efektywność zwalczania przestępczości terrorystycznej przez polskie służby specjalne?, 
(2) W jakim stopniu rozwiązania w polskim prawie, w zakresie zwalczania przestępczości ter-
rorystycznej, mogą naruszać prawa i wolności obywateli polskich oraz cudzoziemców? W celu 
udzielania odpowiedzi na pytania badawcze wykorzystano ujęcie prawno-instytucjonalne w za-
kresie analizy zadań i uprawnień polskich służb specjalnych. Natomiast do analizy regulacji 
prawnych związanych z inwigilacją zastosowano interpretację dogmatyczno-doktrynalną oraz 
interpretację prokonstytucyjną przepisów prawa karnego.
 
Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo antyterrorystyczne, bezpieczeństwo informacji, przestęp-
stwa o charakterze terrorystycznym, inwigilacja, służby specjalne

